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DRAFTING UNIFORM FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE
Thomas F. Green, Jr.t
The author discusses previous efforts to bring about comprehensive im-
provement in the law of evidence and the impact these attempts may
have on the development of uniform rules of evidence for the federal
courts. Also discussed are the problems involved in drafting such uniform
rules and their possible solutions. The author concludes that several apparent
problems, suck as the Erie doctrine, actually present no major obstacles
to the promulgation by the Supreme Court, under its rule-making power,
of rules of evidence, where they may be rationally classified as rules of
procedure.
On March 8, 1965, the Chief Justice of the United States announced the
appointment of a committee of federal judges, law professors, and leading
trial lawyers to formulate uniform rules to govern the admissibility of
evidence and the competency of witnesses in civil and criminal trials in the
United States district courts.' The resulting draft will be considered and
possibly promulgated by the Supreme Court. The word "uniform" as used
in the announcement carries at least two special connotations. The first
arises from the fact that the rules now applied in civil actions in the district
courts are derived from a source different from that of the criminal evi-
dence rules in the same courts.' This situation was not present at common
law and is not present today in the state courts. It exists in the federal
courts from purely fortuitous circumstances. The proposal is to have
"uniform" rules which in general will be the same for civil and criminal
trials. The second connotation of "uniform" is that the precepts will be the
same throughout the United States and will not vary from state to state or
circuit to circuit to the extent that they do in some instances today.3 The
t A.B. 1925, LL.B. 1927, University of Georgia; J.S.). 1931, University of Chicago. Pro-
fessor of law, University of Georgia.
1 The committee is composed of 15 members-3 federal judges, 8 trial lawyers, a govern-
ment attorney, and 3 law school faculty members. Albert E. Jenner, Jr. of Chicago is the
Chairman, and Professor Edward W. Cleary of the University of Illinois College of Law is
the Reporter. See 36 F.R.). 128 (1965).
2 See text preceding note 133 infra.
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) provides in part: "All evidence shall be admitted which is ad-
missible . . . under the rules of evidence . . . of the state in which the United States court
is held.' As to the tendency for conflicts between the circuits under Fed. R. Crim. P. 26
to remain unresolved, see text accompanying notes 135-37 infra.
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language of the promulgated rules will be determined by the Supreme
Court, but the interpretation of the rules by the lower courts will doubt-
less vary to some extent.
It is the purpose of this article first to discuss what may be done to
satisfy the widely recognized need for improvement in evidence law in
general, and second to consider the special problems of the federal courts.
The treatment under the latter topic will be divided into two parts: the
need for change arising from present conditions peculiar to the United
States district courts, and the problems created by limitations upon the
existing rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
GENERAL NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT IN EVIDENCE LAW
AND How IT MAY BE MET
In addition to problems peculiar to the federal courts, the committee
no doubt will deal with those which are common to a great many Anglo-
American jurisdictions. The need for reform of our law of evidence is
apparent. Though Jeremy Bentham's criticisms of common-law procedure'
initiated reforms in procedural law generally, the reforms in evidence were
meager in comparison to those in pleading. Through the ensuing years this
contrast has continued; while pleading and trial practice have been
modernized, evidence doctrines have lagged behind.
Function and Content of Rules
In a recent concurring opinion Judge Fuld of the New York Court of
Appeals said: "Absent some strong public policy or a clear act of pre-
emption by the Legislature, rules of evidence should be fashioned to
further, not frustrate, the truth-finding function of the courts in civil
cases."6 Professor Weinstein, however, points out that truth-finding is
only one of several goals to be achieved. He sees the task of the draftsman
as that of devising evidentiary rules which recognize and capitalize upon
the changes in the climate of our society and courts, and at the same
time remain faithful to the jury trial and the adversarial system.'
Once these broad goals are acknowledged, the draftsman must deter-
mine the general structure of the rules directed toward their fulfillment.
4 See Bentham, Rationale of the Law of Evidence (Mill ed. 1827). Wigmore has com-
mented: "No one can say how long our law might have waited for regeneration, if Bentham's
diatribes had not lashed the community into a sense of its shortcomings." 1 Wigmore,
Evidence § 8, at 239 (3d ed. 1940).
5 See Morgan & Maguire, "Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence," 50 Harv. L.
Rev. 909, 910 (1937); McCormick, "Tomorrow's Law of Evidence," 24 A.B.AJ. 507, 508
(1938); McCormick, Evidence xi (1954).
6 Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 341, 200 N.E.2d 550, 554, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647, 653
(1964) (concurring opinion).
7 Weinstein, "Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial
Trials," 66 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 225, 228-29, 241 (1966).
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He must decide among first, a lengthy, detailed statement based upon a
listing of the matters previously ruled upon by the courts and upon an
effort to anticipate other applications of the same rulings; second, a state-
ment of a few broad general principles; and third, a set of rules dealing
in general terms with the larger categories and subdivisions of evidence
law. The first method would present an almost impossible task and would
result in a rigid, unwieldy set of regulations that would tend to interfere
with the future development of the law. The product of the second method
would be so vague that it would encourage appeals from the trial judge's
rulings. The American Law Institute's Model Code,8 the Uniform Rules,9
the New Jersey Rules,'0 and the four codes of evidence recently adopted
by statute1 illustrate the third method, which seems to be the best choice.
Among the general reasons given by the commentators for advocating
improvement in the law of evidence are the needs for clarification, simpli-
fication,12 modernization," and flexibility. In addition, it is felt that the
present rules lead to the magnification of details and to overemphasis
by appellate courts of errors made at the trial level. 4 The shortcomings
have been attributed to (a) a belief that exclusionary rules can prevent
perjury, (b) a failure to realize that our jurors are better qualified today
than in the past, (c) the failure to realize that it is in the interest of
justice for a witness to be permitted to disclose all relevant information
so long as the triers of fact are able to evaluate what they hear, and (d)
the failure to recognize the superior value of statements made by a wit-
ness near the time of the event described by him, as compared with his
testimony given months or years later.15
Attempts To Revise the Law of Evidence Through Rules of Court
Near the end of the last century James Bradley Thayer proposed that
the mass of detailed, conflicting, and confusing rules of evidence be mod-
ernized by rules of court. He pointed out the special qualifications of the
judges for this task and discussed the opportunity they would have to
8 ALI Model Code of Evidence (1942).
9 Uniform Rules of Evidence, 9A U.LA. 589 (1965).
"1 N.J. Rules of Evidence, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:84A-1-32 (Supp. 1965) (a codification
of statutory and court-adopted rules [hereinafter cited as N.J. Rules of Evidence].
11 See note 18 infra.
12 Ladd, "A Modern Code of Evidence," 27 Iowa L. Rev. 213, 214 (1942); Gard, "rhy
Oregon Lawyers Should Be Interested in the Uniform Rules of Evidence," 37 Ore. L. Rev.
287, 298 (1958); Morgan, "Foreword," ALl Model Code of Evidence 5-6 (1942). See
McCormick, Evidence xi (1954); 1 Wigmore, supra note 4, at xiv.
Is "To put it another way, the law of evidence is now where the law of forms of action
and common law pleading was in the early part of the nineteenth century." Morgan, supra
note 12, at 5. McCormick, supra note 12; Weinstein, supra note 7, at 226-27.
14 1 Wigmore, supra note 4, § 8c, at 264, 267, 271.
15 Morgan, supra note 12, at 6; Weinstein, supra note 7, at 225; Moscowitz, "Trends
in Federal Law and Procedure," 5 F.R.D. 361, 367-68 (1946); McCormick, supra note 12.
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improve the law by giving effect to fundamental principles and by recog-
nizing the subordinate, auxiliary character and aim of the exceptional and
special rules. Two of the fundamental principles which he mentioned were
(1) that nothing is to be received which is not relevant and (2) that
everything which is relevant should be admitted, unless a clear ground
of policy or law excludes it. 6 Since Thayer wrote, the practice of using
advisory committees of practicing lawyers and law professors to aid the
judges in supervising the research and the original drafting has developed
into an established technique. The courts' burden of rule-making is thus
reduced.
However, the courts have not followed Thayer's suggestion. Although
the total of all evidence regulations adopted under their rule-making
power by the several courts in this country is considerable,17 only the
New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted an extensive revision of its evi-
dence law. The federal courts also lack a complete set of court rules.
Rules of court dealing with evidence for the district courts of the United
States have long been in existence. They were a part of the Federal Equity,
Bankruptcy, and Admiralty Rules as well as the Federal Rules of Civil
and Criminal Procedure." None of these, however, furnished a compre-
hensive codification.
16 Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898). Thayer's
suggestion still retains vitality. A 1958 resolution of the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association recognized the need for clarifying and improving the evidence rules of this
country and indicated that piecemeal changes are not enough. This resolution was directed
specifically to evidence in the federal courts and proposed the use of rules of court to codify
evidence law. 44 A.BAJ. 1113 (1958).
17 See Green, "To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe
Rules of Evidence?" 26 A.BXAJ. 482, 487-88 (1940).18 N.J. Rules of Evidence 3-14, 17-20, 41-71, adopted pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84-
33 (Supp. 1965). Aside from this revision through rules of court, New Jersey has to some
extent codified its law of evidence by statute. E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:84A-17-32 (Supp.
1965) (privilege). Several other jurisdictions have adopted evidence codes by statute. Cal.
Evid. Code (effective Jan. 1, 1967); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-401-470 (1964); C.Z. Code
tit. 5, §§ 2731-2996 (1963) ; V.1. Code Ann. tit. 5, §§ 771-956 (1957). In Utah and Missouri,
elaborate studies have been made and rules drafted, but apparently never promulgated. See
"Preliminary Draft of the Rules of Evidence," 27 Utah B. Bull. 5 (1957); Morgan, 'Prac-
tical Difficulties Impeding Reform in the Law of Evidence," 14 Vand. L. Rev. 725 (1961).
In England evidence has been regulated to some extent by exercise of the rule-making
power. Tidd's Practice cites two ancient rules of court dealing with the form and content
of affidavits and proof of documents. Tidd's Practice 497, 799 (4th Am. ed. 1856). The
present English rules contain several orders dealing with similar subjects. E.g., The Annual
Practice, Ord. 37 (1954). In India, in some of the British colonies and protectorates, and
in Israel, the legislative bodies have adopted evidence codes. Nokes, "Codification of the
Law of Evidence in Common Law jurisdictions," 5 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 347, 350, 352 (1956).
In England evidence reform currently is under study. Two groups known as "working
parties" were established by the Law Society at the request of the Home Secretary's Crim-
inal Law Revision Committee and the Lord Chancellor's Law Reform Committee to con-
sider the law of evidence in criminal and civil matters respectively. 62 Law Society's Gazette
143 (March 1965); Cross, "Criminal Evidence Act, 1965," 28 Modern L. Rev. 571, 572(1965). Thus the English groups and, in the United States, the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Evidence have been reviewing the same field of the law at the same time. This
may be only a coincidence but on the other hand may be significant as a simultaneous
awakening in the two countries.
19 Equity Rules of 1912, R. 46, 226 U.S. 661; General Orders in Bankruptcy, Gen. Order
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During the years 1937-38 the late Judge John J. Parker of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was Chairman of the
Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association. He
appointed seven committees to deal with needed reforms in as many
subdivisions of the field of procedure, the general objective being improve-
ment in the administration of justice. The committee in charge of the
subject of evidence was headed by Dean Wigmore.2 0 One matter which
this committee considered was the possibility of simplifying the great
mass of evidence law and organizing it into a code. 1 The need for some
such systematizing was obvious to anyone who gave a little study to the
problemh. Even today the huge number of statutes, decisions, and doc-
trines in a single jurisdiction is simply staggering. The material is so
large in amount and so unorganized that appellate courts find it extremely
difficult to handle. They continue to decide the same questions again and
again, many of the decisions being unsound or conflicting. 22 Due to these
conditions, a trial judge cannot deal adequately with the problems which
arise during the trial and which must be disposed of in haste 3
Of the many recommendations made by the Wigmore Committee, six
are already in effect in the federal district courts. The federal district
judge is permitted to comment on the evidence; 24 he takes judicial notice
of the laws of all the states of the Union; 25 counsels' exceptions to rul-
ings have been abolished; 26 the Model Business Entries Statute has been
adopted by Congress;27 and the recommendations for certified copies and
discovery before trial are satisfied by the Federal Rules.28 Some of the
other recommendations of the Wigmore Committee, such as a change in
the attitude of appellate courts and the adoption of a canon of ethics on
the subject of frequent objections to trivial evidence, may be unsuitable
to be dealt with by rules of court.
36, in 11 U.S.C.A. following § 53 (1964); Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime
Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. R 29-33, 45-46B (1964); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37, 41(b), 43, 44, 45, 50,
59(a), 60(b), 61, 68, 80(c); Fed. R. Crim. P. 5, 6(e), 15, 16, 17, 26, 27, 28, 33, 41(e), 51, 52.
20 The committee also included Robert G. Dodge and Judges Ernest A. Inglis, Merril
E. Otis, and Walter E. Treanor. The committee made some two dozen recommendations
for reform or for further study. Report of the Section of Judicial Administration, 63 A.B.A.
Rep. 522, 525, 570-601 (1938).
21 Id. at 576.
22 See Section of Judicial Administration, A.B.A., Handbook 73, 75 (1961).
23 See Report of the Section of Judicial Administration, supra note 20, at 576; Estes,
"The Need for Uniform Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts," 24 F.R.D. 331, 332 (1959).
24 Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 14 (1899) ; Chesnut, "Instructions to the Jury,"
3 F.R.D. 113, 117 (1943).
25 Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218 (1885); Gediman v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 299 F.2d
537 (2d Cir. 1962).
28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 46.
27 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964).
28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 44, 26-37.
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The Uniform Rules of Evidence as a Foundation for Reform
A dozen of the other recommendations of the Wigmore Committee
would be given effect in the federal courts by an adoption of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws." These rules have been approved by the American Bar Association
and the American Law Institute,"0 and have been adopted with some
modification in Kansas,81 the Panama Canal Zone,3 2 and the Virgin
Islands.3 California and New Jersey have promulgated considerably
modified versions. 4 Of course the use of the Uniform Rules as a basis
for a draft of evidence rules for the United States district courts would
not prevent modifications by the Supreme Court or Advisory Committee;
changes have been made in all of the states which have adopted the Rules.
But, whether the Uniform Rules are heavily relied upon or whether, as
Professor E. M. Morgan advocates, the draftsmen should adopt a com-
bination of the best features of the Uniform Rules and the American
Law Institute's Model Code, 3 it seems certain that the great amount of
work and discussion which resulted in the Uniform Rules and the Model
Code will not be ignored. The discussion below is limited largely (1) to
those provisions of the Uniform Rules which wholly or partially follow
the recommendations of the Wigmore Committee and are not already a
part of federal law and (2) to those recommendations of the Wigmore
Committee which move in the same general direction as the Uniform
Rules.33
Procedure and the Harmless Error Rule
Rules 4 and 5 of the Uniform Rules3 7 provide that a verdict or finding
or the judgment based thereon shall not be set aside or reversed except
29 9A U.LA. 589 (1965). The committee which drafted the Rules consisted of a trialjudge, four active practitioners, and two law school faculty members. Handbook of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 17 (1950).
30 Gard, "The Uniform Rules of Evidence," 31 Tul. L. Rev. 19 n.1 (1956).
81 Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-401-470 (1964).
32 C.Z. Code tit. 5, §§ 2731-2996 (1963).
33 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, §§ 771-956 (1957).
34 Cal. Evid. Code (effective Jan. 1, 1967); NJ. Rules of Evidence, NJ. Stat. Ann.§§ 2A:84A-1-32 (Supp. 1965) (a codification of statutory and court-adopted rules). The
California Code is to a large extent a restatement of existing California law, but the drafts-
men studied carefully the Uniform Rules and used a number of their provisions.
35 Professor Morgan has indicated that such a combination would be an improvement
over both formulations. Morgan, "The Uniform Rules and the Model Code," 31 Tul: L.
Rev. 145, 151-52 (1956).
38 Of course, the Uniform Rules as a whole attempt to simplify the law of evidence by
formulating what is in effect a short code, thus adopting the following recommendation
of the Wigmore Committee: "We recommend . . . the formulation of a simplified code of
evidence rules for use in jury trials." Report of the Committee on Improvements in the
Law of Evidence, Section of judicial Administration, 63 A.B.A. Rep. 570, 577 (1938)
[hereinafter cited as Evidence Committee Report].
37 Uniform Rule 4 relates to the effect of error in the admission of evidence and rule 5,
in the exclusion of evidence.
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under the following circumstances: (a) the record must show timely,
clear, and specific objection to error in the receipt of evidence, or, if the
error is in exclusion of evidence, the record must show that the proponent
either made an offer approved by the judge or indicated the substance
of the expected evidence by leading questions; (b) the court passing upon
the effect of error must be of the opinion that the admitted evidence
should have been excluded on the ground stated and probably had a sub-
stantial influence in bringing about the verdict or finding, or that the
excluded evidence should have been admitted and would probably have
had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict or finding.
Part (b) of this requirement adopts proposal II, 3 of the Wigmore Com-
mittee regarding regulation of the attitude of appellate courts.38
The California Evidence Code adopts Uniform Rules 4 and 5,"9 but
substitutes for the last phrase in part (b) of each a requirement that, in
order to be grounds for setting aside or reversal, the error or errors must
result in a miscarriage of justice.4" The concept comes from the California
Constitution.41 Because of its abstract terms, similar language has been
called "futile" by the Wigmore Committee.4 The New Jersey Rules of
Evidence omit the provisions of Uniform Rules 4 and 5, but their sub-
stance is partially contained in previously existing rules of court.43 The
Kansas statute based on the Uniform Rules of Evidence omits part (b)
of both rules 4 and 5.44 Perhaps the legislature felt that the general harm-
less error provision,4 5 relating to civil procedure but mentioning errors in
the admission or exclusion of evidence, was sufficient. Although rule 5 is
included in the evidence provisions of the Canal Zone Code,4 rule 4 is
omitted. In lieu of the (b) part of rule 4, a reference is made to Rule 61
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which uses "substantial justice"
and "substantial rights" as the tests for determining whether an error
in the admission of evidence is reversible. These expressions, like the
California language, merely present abstract terms. Thus, among the
38 The committee recommended:
[Tihe improper rejection or admission of evidence shall not be ground of itself for
directing a new trial if it appears to the reviewing court that independently of the
evidence objected to and admitted there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision,
or that if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision.
Evidence Committee Report 573.
89 Cal. Evid. Code §§ 353-54 (effective Jan. 1, 1967).
40 Cal. Evid. Code § 353(b) (effective Jan. 1, 1967).
41 See Cal. Const. art. 6, § 4 1/2.
42 Evidence Committee Report 574.
43 NJ. Rules of Evidence 4-5.
44 Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-404-405 (1964).
45 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-261 (1964).
46 C.Z. Code tit. 5, § 2735 (1963).
47 C.Z. Code tit. 5, § 2734 (1963).
48 See text preceding note 40 supra.
1967]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
recent codifiers, only the Virgin Islands has followed the Wigmore Com-
mittee's recommendation that the test be specific enough to prevent an
automatic reversal for erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence. 9
Nevertheless, the Committee recommendations still seem to be sound.
Interspousal Immunity
Recommendation III, 17 of the Wigmore Committee advocated the
abolition of the doctrine (referred to as a privilege by Wigmore) used
to prevent one spouse from testifying against the other." The Uniform
Rules accomplish this through rule 7, which includes a provision abolish-
ing all privileges and disqualifications not otherwise provided for in the
Rules. There is no provision covering antispousal testimony except rule
28, which grants a privilege for confidential marital communications.
Thus the Wigmore recommendation was adopted by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. New Jersey,51 the Canal Zone,52 and the Virgin
Islands seem to have followed the Uniform Rules,54 but California and
Kansas have not. Their codifications retain provisions which preserve a
privilege not to testify against one's spouse. 5 In Kansas this privilege is
limited to criminal cases.
Attorney-Client Privilege
Proposal III, 11 of the Wigmore Committee was that an attempt be
made to draft a statute which would make it clear that the attorney-client
privilege for confidential communications is to be denied where the attor-
ney had knowledge or ground to believe that the client was contemplating
the commission of a crime (or fraud) or was attempting to suppress the
discovery of such an act already committed. The language of Uniform
Rule 26(2) (a) seems to cover this situation, but uses the word "tort"
instead of "fraud."57 This language was adopted in Kansas,58 the Canal
49 See V.I. Code tit. 5, §§ 774-75 (1957).
50 Evidence Committee Report 594-96.
51 N.J. Rule of Evidence 7.
52 C.Z. Code fit. 5, § 2737 (1963).
53 V.J. Code fit. 5, § 777 (1957).
54 The Canal Zone and the Virgin Islands use the language of Uniform Rule 7, which
begins, "Except as otherwise provided in these Rules . . ." and goes on, with that exception,
to abolish all disqualifications of witnesses and privileges and to make all relevant evidence
admissible. The language of Rule 7 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence begins, "Except
as otherwise provided in these rules or by other law of this State . . . ." None of the three
sets of rules grants any interspousal privilege except for communications.
55 Cal. Evid. Code § 970 (effective Jan. 1, 1967); Kan. Stat. Ann. 22 60-407, 62-1420
(1964).
56 Evidence Committee Report 589.
57 Rule 26(2) (a) provides in part that the attorney-client privilege:
ESIhall not extend (a) to a communication if the judge finds that sufficient evidence
aside from the communication, has been introduced to warrant a finding that the legal
service was sought or obtained in order to enable or aid the client to commit or plan
to commit a crime or a tort ....
Aside from the broadening of the exception to the attorney-client privilege by the use of
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Zone,59 and the Virgin Islands. 0 Different language was used in Califor-
nia"' and New Jersey.62 The provisions in those two states are not exactly
alike, but they have in common four differences from Uniform Rule
26(2) (a). First, they describe the exception to the privilege in fewer
words;"' second, they omit the requirement for evidence, aside from the
communication, sufficient to warrant a finding; 4 third, they seem to
require a finding by the judge that legal services with the designated rela-
tion to the commission of a crime or fraud actually were sought or
obtained, rather than merely a finding that sufficient evidence was intro-
duced to warrant invoking the exception to the attorney-client privilege;
fourth, they substitute Wigmore's word "fraud" for the "tort" of the
Uniform Rule. 5
"Dead-Man" Statutes
The effect of Rules 7 and 17 of the Uniform Rules would be to abolish
the disqualification of the survivor under the Dead-Man Statutes.6 This
step would carry out recommendation III, 1 of the Wigmore Committee 7
and would bring the law into line with that of England, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode Island, and South Dakota,
where the disqualification is not in effect.6 8 In these jurisdictions unscru-
pulous survivors have not been noticeably successful in raiding the estates
of deceased persons.6 Consequently a change in the law in the other
jurisdictions should not prove unfair to the estates of decedents. At the
same time the change would give relief to honest survivors who find them-
selves unable to establish their valid claims against an estate.70 It is
clear that Dead-Man Statutes do not accomplish their purpose, which is
to prevent dishonest claimants from fleecing estates. The reason they
cannot be successful is that a person who would through his own testi-
"tort," the exception may also be broadened because of the use of the word "obtained" in
the Uniform Rule. See Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953) (advice
to get rid of murder weapon seemingly volunteered).
58 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-426(b) (1) (1964).
Be C.Z. Code tit. 5, § 2854(b)'(1) (1963).
60 V.1. Code tit. 5, § 854(2) (a) (1957).
61 See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 954, 956 (effective Jan. 1, 1967).
62 See NJ. Rule of Evidence 26(2) (a).
63 Compare rule 26(2) (a), quoted in note 57 supra, with Cal. Evid. Code § 956 (effective
Jan. 1, 1967): "There is no privilege . . .if the services of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud."
64 Compare N.J. Rule of Evidence 26(2)(a) with Uniform Rule of Evidence 26(2)(a),
quoted in part in note 63 supra.
65 N.J. Rule of Evidence 26(2) (a); Cal. Evid. Code § 956 (effective Jan. 1, 1967),
quoted in part in note 63 supra.
66 See Ladd, "Witnesses," 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 523, 525 (1956).
67 Evidence Committee Report 581-82.
68 Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 334, 338 (1949).
69 See Morgan et al., the Law of Evidence, Some Proposals for its Reform ch. I1 (1927).
70 See ALI Model Code of Evidence rule 101, comment b at 31-34 (1942).
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mony falsify a claim would not hesitate to suborn perjury. The statutes
do not and cannot prevent the survivor from obtaining others who will
bear false witness against the estate. It is, therefore, the honest survivor
rather than the dishonest one who is defeated by this type of legislation.71
Judicial Notice of Foreign Country Law
Judicial notice of the law of foreign countries is authorized by Uniform
Rules 9(2) (b) and 9(3). One commentator has called this the most ob-
jectionable feature of the judicial notice provisions.72 He implies that this
is a new feature by saying: "In this respect the Rules 'expand into virgin
territory.' ',7 Actually four states already require their courts to take
notice of the law of foreign countries without evidence, 74 two permit
them to do so,75 and another state requires notice to be taken of the law
of foreign common-law jurisdictions." In addition, writers approve the
noticing of the law of foreign countries.
77
The Opinion Rule
The opinion rule is made somewhat less restrictive by the Uniform
Rules-first, by substituting the requirement that the opinion be help-
ful7" for the orthodox requirement of necessity, and second, by abolishing
the prohibition of opinions on the ultimate issue.79 These provisions move
in the direction of recommendation III, 3 of the Wigmore Committee. 0
Rule 57 provides that the judge may first require the witness to be exam-
ined concerning the data upon which the opinion or inference is based.
The leading authorities have approved the principles underlying these
71 See McCormick, Evidence § 65, at 143 (1954).
72 Stopher, "The Uniform Rules of Evidence: Government by Man Instead of by Law,"
29 Ins. Counsel J. 405, 409 (1962).
73 Ibid.
74 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 70 (1956); Miss. Code Ann. § 1761 (1957); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 8-4 (1953); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5711 (1961).
75 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4511(b) (formerly N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 344(a)); Mich.
Comp. Laws §§ 617.25, 617.27 (1948).
76 Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 47 (1965).
77 See McCormick, Evidence § 326, at 699 (1954); Keefe et al., "Sense and Nonsense
about Judicial Notice," 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664, 689 (1950); Nussbaum, "Proving the Law of
Foreign Countries," 3 Am. J. Comp. Law 60 (1954).
Professor Davis suggests that the judicial notice provisions of the Uniform Rules could
be improved. He proposes a formula which he says more nearly describes what the courts
actually do in practice. Davis, "Judicial Notice," 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945 (1955).
78 Uniform Rule of Evidence 56:
(1) If the witness is not testifying as an expert his testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to such opinions or inferences as the judge finds (a) may be
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear under-
standing of his testimony or to the determination of the fact in issue.
79 Uniform Rule of Evidence 56(4): "Testimony in the form of opinions or inferences
otherwise admissible under these rules is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate
issue or issues to be decided by the trier of fact."
80 Evidence Committee Report 583.
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rules dealing with opinion,"' and a number of the jurisdictions which
recently codified their evidence laws have adopted Uniform Rules 56
and 57.82
The Hearsay Doctrine
The Uniform Rules adopt several changes concerning hearsay. At least
six are important. The first is a simplified definition involving a narrower
scope than under older approaches. According to rule 63 hearsay evidence
consists of "a statement which is made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated . . .. "" As indicated, the meaning seems to be narrower than
that presently adopted by some courts. There is authority which treats
as hearsay non-assertive conduct offered to prove the truth of the actor's
or declarant's belief concerning a certain fact."4 The leading decision
among the authorities which treat this conduct as hearsay is the English
case of Wright v. Tatham.5 In that case letters treating a testator as
competent to transact business and able to understand the ordinary
affairs of daily life were held inadmissible on the issue of competency to
make a will. The letters contained no statement as to the testator's
mental capacity and were written to him under circumstances indicating
that they were not intended as assertions on that subject. Nevertheless
the letters were held to be hearsay and inadmissible. Under Uniform
Rules 62 and 63 conduct which the circumstances do not show was in-
tended as an assertion apparently would not be hearsay even though
offered to prove the belief of the actor. This would follow because the
fact is not stated by the declarant, but his belief of the fact is to be in-
ferred from his conduct. Such evidence probably will simply be con-
sidered circumstantial evidence. Safeguards against its improper use will
be furnished by rule 45.88 In many instances the probative value of the
81 E.g., McCormick, Evidence §§ 11-12, at 23, 24, 26 (1954) ; 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1918
(3d ed. 1940).82 Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-456-457 (1964); N.J. Rules of Evidence 56-57 (omitting Rule
56(3) of the Uniform Rules which provides that by admitting evidence the judge "shall be
deemed to have made the finding requisite to its admission") ; C.Z. Code tit. 5, §§ 2931-32(1963); V.I. Code tit. 5, §§ 911-12 (1957). But see Cal. Evid. Code § 800 (effective Jan.
1, 1967) (apparently codifying pre-existing law as to the "ultimate issue" rule, while at
the same time requiring that evidence be "helpful" rather than necessary).
83 Uniform Rule of Evidence 63.
84 Thompson v. Manhattan Ry., 11 App. Div. 182, 42 N.Y. Supp. 896 (2d Dep't 1896);
McCormick, Evidence § 229, at 470-74 (1954); cf. Hanson v. State, 160 Ark. 329, 254 S.W.
691 (1923) ; Matter of Estate of Loucks, 160 Cal. 551, 558, 117 Pac. 673, 676 (1911).
85 5 Cl. & Fin. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
88 Uniform Rule of Evidence 45:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create sub-
stantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or misleading the jury,
or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportu-
nity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
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evidence would be increased by the fact that the conduct was important
or significant to the actor and thus verifies his belief. This simplification
and clarification of the concept of hearsay is desirable.
The second change made by the Uniform Rules in the hearsay area is
the creation of a new exception for evidence of statements made out of
court by a person present at the hearing and available for cross-exami-
nation, provided the statement would be admissible if made by the de-
clarant while testifying as a witness.87 According to the Commissioners'
Note accompanying this provision, 8 this exception will make admissible
prior consistent or inconsistent statements as evidence of the truth of
the facts stated. The justifications for the change are that prior statements
are nearer in time to the occurrence than is the testimony, and that the
opportunity to cross-examine, the very thing that the hearsay rule is
designed to provide, is preserved. Because the Note makes it clear, by
mentioning consistent and inconsistent statements, that the prior state-
ment of the witness is to be admissible when the declarant's testimony
at trial purports to cover the same subject matter as the declaration pre-
viously made, a "record of past recollection" also should be held to be
within the exception."" By the better view such a record is admissible
under current law even though the declarant-witness has a present recol-
lection of the facts previously written down." If he testifies to these facts
from the witness stand, the written statement is clearly covered by the
language of the prior-statement exception. If he has no present memory
of the facts previously written, the statement is still probably covered.
The language "available for cross examination with respect to the state-
ment and its subject matter"91 seems to be intended to require that the
declarant be available for cross-examination after the opponent knows
that the prior statement will be offered in evidence, and not intended to
require that the declarant-witness have a memory of any particular facts.
Aside from the requirements that the declarant-witness be available
87 Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1) specifically excepts from the hearsay exclusion:
A statement previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available
for cross examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided
the statement would be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a wit-
nes...
88 Commissioners' Note to Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1), 9A U.A. 640, 641 (1965).
89 The argument as to "records of past recollection," based on the Commissioners' Note
to rule 63(1), may not be accepted by the federal courts if rule 63(1) is adopted for the
United States district courts, since the Supreme Court has held that a memorandum should
not be admitted if the writer who is the witness presenting the memorandum has a present
memory of the facts recorded. Vicksburg & M.R.R. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99, 102 (1886).
McCormick thought that records of past recollection should be admissible under 63(1)
because its language is broad enough and no other provision of the Rules covers them.
McCormick, "Hearsay," 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 620, 622 (1956).
90 See Fisher v. Kyle, 27 Mich. 454 (1873).
91 See note 87 supra.
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for cross-examination and that he have no present recollection of the facts
recorded, common law imposed three other conditions on the admission
of records of past recollection 2 The first of these, namely that the de-
clarant have first-hand knowledge of the facts declared, is preserved by
rule 63(1) ("provided the statement would be admissible if made by
declarant while testifying as a witness"). Two other requirements, first
that the writing be made or checked at a time not too long after the
events recorded, and second that the witness must in his testimony vouch
for the correctness of the writing, are not mentioned by the rule. Since
63 (1) certainly appears to cover records of past recollection by including
them in the statements referred to, these two requirements apparently
have been abolished. No other part of the rule deals with the admissibility
of these records, and rule 7 makes all relevant evidence admissible except
as otherwise provided." It is submitted, however, that a new requirement
should be added to 63(1). It would appear that the provision would be
improved by adding at the end, "and the judge finds that the statement
was not made for the purpose of having it introduced in litigation."
A dictum by the United States Supreme Court in Bridges v. Wixon, 4
a habeas corpus case, raises a question as to the constitutionality of the
prosecution's use of a witness' prior inconsistent statements to prove the
truth of the facts stated. At the trial the witness had repudiated his pre-
vious unsworn statement, and in its opinion the Court used language
which suggests that a conviction based on unsworn testimony may violate
the due process clause. 5 Even though this dictum does not seem to affect
the admissibility of consistent statements, it nevertheless is an unfortu-
nate suggestion. 6 The hearsay rule with all its peculiarities should not
be given the status of constitutional doctrine. 7
The Uniform Rule's third important change concerning hearsay alters
and clarifies doctrines relating to depositions and former testimony. These
92 See McCormick, Evidence § 277 (1954).
93 McCormick, without disclosing his reasons, took the opposite position as to the effect
of rule 63(1) on the common-law requirements. McCormick, supra note 89, at 622.
94 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945).
95 The Court said of prior inconsistent statements:
But they certainly would not be admissible in any criminal case as substantive evidence
.... So to hold would allow men to be convicted on unsworn testimony of witnesses-a
practice which runs counter to the notions of fairness on which our legal system is
founded.
Id. at 153-54. [Citations omitted.]
96 See Morgan, '"Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept," 62
Harv. L. Rev. 177, 194-95 (1948).
97 The Wixon case was distinguished in a case in which an out-of-court identification,
although unsworn at the time it was originally made, was confirmed as to accuracy by
the witness at the trial. Sworn testimony by the identifier as to his prior identification was




are treated by the Rules as hearsay when offered to prove the truth of
the statements contained therein. Therefore an exception to the hearsay
rule is necessary if any such testimony or deposition is to be admitted.
Rule 63(3) provides the exception. A deposition taken for use in the trial
of the action in which it is offered is admissible even though the deponent
is available at the trial. This liberalization of the permitted use of depo-
sitions is sound and points in the same direction as a provision in Rule
26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 Uniform Rule 63(3) (a)
is the more liberal provision, but it deserves approval. It is absurd to
require unavailability of the deponent even though he made his statement
under oath and subject to cross-examination when no such requirement
is made for "spontaneous declarations," statements of bodily condition
made to physicians to obtain treatment, or admissions, which have neither
safeguard. 99
With regard to depositions and testimony taken in a different case,
rule 63(3) substitutes, for the orthodox requirement of identity of issues
and parties, the provision that the issue be such that the former adverse
party had the opportunity for cross-examination with an interest and
motive similar to those of the adverse party in the later action. 10 The
effect of this provision is to abolish the senseless requirement of "reci-
procity"' 0 ' (also called "mutuality") which is still in force in some juris-
dictions. 02
Uniform Rule 63 (3) does not make admissible depositions taken for
the purpose of discovery. This is contrary to the result under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which provide liberally for the use of depositions
as evidence.103 Even in a jurisdiction where the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence are not in force, discovery depositions probably are admissible for
98 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). See note 103 infra.
99 See Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1), (4), (7), (12).
100 Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(3) (b) (ii).
101 The doctrine of reciprocity requires both that the party against whom the evidence
is offered be either the same in each case or in privity, and that the offering party be either
the same in both actions or in privity, so that the evidence would have been admissible
if offered against the offeror. For criticism of the doctrine, see Morgan, "The Law of
Evidence 1941-1945," 59 Harv. L. Rev. 481, 551 (1946); Falknor, "Former Testimony and
the Uniform Rules: A Comment," 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 651, 653 (1963). Professor Falknor
considers the abolition of the first requirement-identity of opponent-to be of debatable
soundness. Id. at 655.
102 See McInturff v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 248 Ill. 92, 93 N.E. 369 (1910);
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Reid Motor Co., 216 N.C. 432, 5 S.E.2d 318 (1939); see
McCormick, Evidence § 232, at 488 (1954).
1o3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) provides for the admission of depositions (1) where the depo-
sition will be used to contradict or impeach "the testimony of the deponent as a witness;"(2) where the deposition is that of a party who at time of deposing was an officer, director,
or managing agent of a corporation, partnership, or association; or (3) under other excep-
tional circumstances such as the inability to bring the deponent into court.
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non-hearsay purposes, or when they come within some exception to the
hearsay rule other than the one for depositions. 10 4
The fourth important change in the Uniform Rules helps to round out
the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Subdivision (4) (c) makes admissible:
[I]f the declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement narrating,
describing, or explaining an event or condition which the judge finds was
made by the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently
perceived by him and while his recollection was clear, and was made in
good faith prior to the commencement of the action.'0 5
Professor McCormick points out that this extension is most needed when
a claim for workman's compensation or for accident-insurance benefits
rests upon a mortal injury observed only by the person injured. 06
Although the details differ the thrust of 63(4) (c) is the same as the
Massachusetts Hearsay Statute of 1898,107 which was generally well-
received by the legal profession in that state.'08
In the criminal area, the constitutionality of 63 (4) (c) has been ques-
tioned because of the accused's sixth amendment right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.'09 But hearsay exceptions have been
recognized as exceptions to the right of confrontation; in some instances
extension of a common-law exception has been approved despite this con-
stitutional attack. 10 Although the possibility of unconstitutionality of
subdivision (c) is speculative and should not prevent its adoption, there
are other objections. The limitations in the provision appear because of
the unwillingness of the Conference of Commissioners to recognize fully
that hearsay has probative value and should be received whenever better
evidence from the same source is not obtainable because the declarant is
unavailable as a witness."' The effort was to lay down prerequisites
which would distinguish the evidence from ordinary hearsay. Phrases like
"good faith" and the one relating to the time of making the statement,
104 Illinois ]aw expressly provides for use of depositions for impeachment, for admissions,
and for the general exceptions to the hearsay rule. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 101.19-10. See
Fitzpatrick & Goff, "Discovery and Depositions," 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628, 632-35 (1955).
105 Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(4)(c).
106 McCormick, supra note 89, at 624.
O Mass. Acts 1898 ch. 535, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 65 (1956). A similar statute
is in force in Rhode Island. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-19-11 (1956).
108 After this act had been in effect for more than 25 years, the Commonwealth Fund
Committee conducted a survey of lawyers and judges in Massachusetts to determine their
views concerning it. Replies were received from 638 of those questioned. Of the ones who
had had experience with the provision, 71% thought well of it while only 19% criticized it.
See Morgan et al., supra note 69, at 31-32 (1927).
109 See Stopher, supra note 72, at 413; Slovenko, "Constitutional Limitations on the
Rules of Evidence," 26 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 493, 505-06 (1957).
110 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). See 5 Wigmore, supra note 81, § 1397,
at 127; Comment, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 746 (1965).
111 See Commissioners' Note to Uniform Rule of Evidence 63, 9A U.LA. 640, 643 (1965).
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however, are ambiguous and may cause trouble. A simple provision, such
as "Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds
that the declarant is unavailable as a witness, 11 2 would have its advan-
tages.
Professor Chadbourn criticizes Uniform Rule 63 (4) (c) on the ground
that, contrary to our established mores with regard to the functions of
the judge and the jury, the judge is authorized by the rule to exclude the
evidence covered by the rule on the ground that he disbelieves it."-'
According to Chadbourn's interpretation of the rule, the trial judge must
find that the statement "was made," and that it was made in good faith."4
If he decides against the truthfulness of the testimony concerning the fact
of the making of the statement, he is to exclude it, and if the judge de-
cides that the declarant was lying, he may also exclude the evidence.
We are accustomed to think that credibility in the second situation is for
the jury and not the judge, unless he is trying the facts himself. Chad-
bourn also suggests that under the present form of 63 (4) (c) the possi-
bility exists of a statement being inadmissible when an out-of-court
declaration is the only evidence of perception by the declarant and of
the statement's recency. If the hearsay rule applies to data offered on
the preliminary question of admissibility, the judge would be considering
hearsay which has not yet been shown to be within an exception. Whether
the rule does apply in connection with the determination of admissibility
is not clear from the authorities.115
In reply to Professor Chadbourn's objections to Uniform Rule 63 (4)
(c), it could be argued that similar language is contained in the Massa-
chusetts Hearsay Statute of 1898, which seems to have worked satis-
factorily for nearly seventy years." 6 In addition, in 1938 the American
Bar Association recommended the adoption by the states of a statute
similar to the Massachusetts act. This provision apparently covered crim-
inal cases and declarations of insane persons as well as decedents. 117
112 Model Code of Evidence rule 503(a) (1942).
113 Chadbourn, "Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4) (c)
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 932 (1962). Professor Chadbourn
prefers the simpler more liberal provision of Rule 503 of the Model Code, quoted in part
in the text accompanying note 112 supra. He suggests, however, that if rule 503 is too
advanced for general application, it could be limited to civil cases. Chadbourn, supra at
950-51.
114 Id. at 947.
115 See Chadbourn, supra note 113, at 948-49; McCormick, Evidence § 53, at 123-24 n.8(1954); Maguire & Epstein, "Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissi-
bility," 36 Yale LJ. 1101 (1927).
116 See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
117 63 A.B.A. Rep. 154, 525 (1938). The California Evidence Code and the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence omit rule 63(4) (c). But compare this rule with Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1240,
1261, and NJ. Rule of Evidence 63(32).
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It would appear that some acceptable form of a broad exception to
the hearsay rule, based on the unavailability of the declarant, should be
developed to give the proponent a chance in the situation where there
is a lack of other evidence from the declarant on a vital point. The trier
of fact may still disbelieve the evidence. A proposal along the lines of
Rule 503 of the Model Code of Evidence may be a desirable solution.
Rule 503 provides for the admissibility of declarations whenever the
declarant is "(a) unavailable as a witness .... ,n2 The unsettled ques-
tion is whether the constitutional right to confrontation would make it
necessary to limit the provision to civil cases." 9
The fifth change adopted by the Uniform Rules relates to vicarious
admissions. Under rule 63(9) (a) the statement of an agent, in order to
be admissible against his principal as an admission, would no longer be
required to have been made in the scope of the agent's duty. Clause (a)
requires only that the agent's statement concern a matter within the
scope of the agent's duty and be made before the termination of the
agency.120 There is some authority in the cases for this doctrine.' 2' Clause
(b) of rule 63 (9) makes a comparable extension with regard to declara-
tions of conspirators.'22 These declarations, in order to be received as
admissions against other members of the conspiracy, would not have to
be in furtherance of the conspiracy if they relate to the subject matter
of the conspiracy and were made before its completion or termination.
An eminent authority has expressed hesitation over acceptance of the
rationale of the two types of admissions, raising the question of whether
authority to act should be accepted as authority to speak.' 3 In the Rules
of Evidence issued by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, briefer language
is used in clause (a) but the coverage is at least as broad, and a statement
which concerns a matter within the scope of an agency or employment
relationship is made admissible. 24 On the other hand, clause (b) of the
118 Model Code of Evidence rule 503 (a) (1942).
119 See McCormick, Evidence § 231, at 483-87 (1954). Uniform Rule 63(4) (c) requires
a finding of circumstances arguably showing special trustworthiness. This is not required
by Model Code rule 503. Consequently 63 (4) (c) might be constitutional even if 503 would
not be.
120 Uniform Rules of Evidence 63 (9) (a).
121 Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958); Martin v. Savage Truck Line,
Inc., 121 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954).
122 Rule 63 (9) (b) makes vicarious statements admissible against a party if:
[Tihe party and the declarant were participating in a plan to commit a crime or a
civil wrong and the statement was relevant to the plan or its subject matter and was
made while the plan was in existence and before its complete execution or other termina-
tion ....
123 Falknor, '"icarious Admissions and the Uniform Rules," 14 Vand. L. Rev. 855,
856-57 (1961).
124 NJ. Rule of Evidence 63(9) (a).
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New Jersey rule preserves the requirement that a conspirator's statement
be in furtherance of the conspiracy. 2 5
The sixth of the more important changes of the Uniform Rules con-
cerning the admissibility of hearsay is accomplished by subdivision (15)
of rule 63. It makes admissible the findings of a public official who has
the duty of making an investigation of fact. 2 Personal knowledge on
the part of the official is not required. McCormick approved this type of
extension of the exception for official written statements. 27
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL COURTS
Both the Uniform Rules and the proposals of the Wigmore Committee
display progressiveness, but they are not radical. These rules and pro-
posals, as well as the studies and drafts of rules based on the Uniform
Rules, should be useful sources in the drafting of federal rules. The com-
mittee should consider all of these, but it may naturally be expected to
develop some ideas of its own.
Matters Not Covered by Uniform Rules
Even if the Federal Rules of Evidence are based on the Uniform Rules
of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, it is very probable that
alterations will be made. In addition to efforts to improve the Commis-
sioners' draft and to eliminate provisions not suitable for constitutional
or other reasons, there is a need to add rules on subjects not covered by
the draft. Some of these additions should deal with federal doctrines
which ought to be changed. For example, many authorities favor a "wide-
open" scope of cross-examination.2 8 The present federal practice is to
limit cross-questioning to matters about which testimony was given on
direct examination. 2 ' A more liberal rule would present little if any
opportunity for argument over its administration. On the other hand, in
the federal courts and in the states following the restrictive practice, the
restrictive rule gives rise to frequent disputes over its application to the
125 N.J. Rule of Evidence 63(9) (b) makes a statement admissible against a party if
"at the time the statement was made the party and the declarant were participating in a
plan to commit a crime or civil wrong and the statement was made in furtherance of that
plan."
126 Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(15) makes admissible:
Subject to Rule 64 [relating to prevention of surprise] written reports or findings of
fact made by a public official of the United States or of a state or territory of the
United States, if the judge finds that the making thereof was within the scope of the
duty of such official and that it was his duty (a) to perform the act reported, or
(b) to observe the act, or condition or event reported, or (c) to investigate the facts
concerning the act, condition or event and to make findings or draw conclusions based
on such investigation.
127 McCormick, supra note 89, at 626.
128 See McCormick, Evidence § 27, at 50-52 (1954).
129 See, e.g., Branch v. United States, 171 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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use of particular questions. Thus the adoption of the unrestrictive prac-
tice would result in a great saving of time and energy. 80
There also seem to be restrictions in the federal courts on the use of
writings to refresh the recollection of a witness. These restrictions are
not followed in the majority of jurisdictions. 8' Perhaps they should be
abandoned or at least clarified through inclusion in the proposed rules.
Sources of Federal Evidentiary Rules
The existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of Criminal Pro-
cedure contain evidence rules which present peculiar difficulties. In part,
the problem stems from the fact that the Civil and Criminal Rules treat
evidence differently, with the result that federal judges must look to two
different sources for evidence doctrines. In another sense, four sources
are actually involved, because under Rule 43(a) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the courts must look to three different sources for the rules
on admissibility and on competency of witnesses. All evidence is to be
admitted "which is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or
under the rules of evidence [applied prior to 1938 in the federal courts]
...on the hearing of suits in equity or ...applied in the courts of
general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is
held.' 81 2 The necessity for prompt trial rulings on objections makes it
impossible for a district court judge to apply such a complicated formula
literally.'88 He can only use his knowledge of general principles. This is
especially true when he has been temporarily assigned to a district in a
state where he is unfamiliar with local law. Though the result is not
necessarily bad, the language of rule 43(a) is obviously unrealistic.1
An important aim of the new rules will be to minimize the sources of
evidence law.
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, unlike Civil Rule
43(a), as usually interpreted frees the federal court from closely follow-
ing precedent by providing that the admissibility of evidence and the
competency and privileges of witnesses are to be governed, in general,
180 England and a minority of states retain the traditional "wide-open" rule of cross-
examination. McCormick, Evidence § 21, at 43 (1954).
'31 Compare cases in 3 Wigmore, supra note 81, § 761, at 106-07 n.4 with United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 236 (1940) and Putnam v. United States, 162
U.S. 687, 694-707 (1896).
182 Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a); cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.
13 Rule 43 has been called a "hodge-podge . .. that creates . . . a very great diffi-
culty of application for the judges." Joiner, "Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal
Courts," 20 F.R.D. 429, 436 (1958). See also Estes, "The Need for Uniform Rules of
Evidence in the Federal Courts," 24 F.R.D. 331 (1960).
184 See Special Committee on Evidence, Judicial Conference of the United States, "Pre-
liminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence
for the Federal Courts," 30 F.R.D. 79, 95-98 (1962).
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"by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."'18 5
This gives the courts an opportunity to modernize, clarify, and simplify
the rules of evidence for criminal cases. Yet the Supreme Court said in
a criminal case in 1948 that it had contributed little to any phase of the
law of evidence. 86 This was because it had rarely had occasion to decide
such issues; a court which decides so few cases in the field "cannot recast
the body of case law on this subject in many, many years, even if it were
clear what the rules should be.' 87 The Court described the law of evi-
dence as archaic, paradoxical, and full of compromises and irrational
compensations, but added: "To pull one misshapen stone out of the
grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance
between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice."'138 Since
the Supreme Court is obviously reluctant, in fact unwilling, to seize the
opportunity granted by rule 26 to improve criminal evidence rules by
decision, the courts of appeals seem to be left with the task. But it is
clearly too much for them, since there is bound to be some conflict among
the eleven circuits.
Applicability of New Rules to Admiralty
In the opinion of the writer, the new rules should be made applicable
in admiralty, and as a result some special exceptions and additional pro-
visions may be needed. In admiralty there has traditionally been a dis-
tinction, regarding rules of evidence, between prize cases and other cases.
In prize cases the usual rules of evidence are not enforced; 8 9 in other
admiralty cases they seem to be applicable, 40 although courts sitting in
admiralty are not bound as strictly by the rules of exclusion as are other
courts. 4 ' This result is in line with the general doctrine that the law of
evidence is relaxed in cases tried without a jury.'4
By a recent amendment, the Rules of Civil Procedure have been made
1385 Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.
186 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
189 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 4d, at 96 (3d ed. 1940).
140 See The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 131 (1897); Kemsley, Millbourn & Co. v. UnitedStates, 19 F.2d 441, 442 (2d Cir. 1927); Archawski v. Hanioti, 239 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), rev'd
on other grounds, 350 U.S. 532 (1956).
141 Clarke S.S. Co. v. Munson S.S. Line, 59 F.2d 423, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 1932); Swift & Co.
v. Compania Transmaritima Colombiana, 83 F. Supp. 273, 279 (D.C.Z. 1948), aff'd, 175
F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 684 (1950); 3 Greenleaf, Evi-
dence 389 n.(a) (14th ed. 1883). Cf. Taylor v. Crain, 224 F.2d 237, 240 (3d Cir. 1955).
142 On the general principle see Bommarito v. Southern Canning Co., 208 F.2d 56, 61
(8th Cir. 1953); Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 407 (1965). But see Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 492-93 (1963). The Note, supra, at 414-15, suggests that special rules of
evidence for nonjury trials be developed on the basis of a distinction (assumed to exist)
between evidence which a trial judge is and is not better qualified than a jury to evaluate.
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applicable in admiralty, except in prize proceedings.14 Therefore, rule 43
now governs the admissibility of evidence and the competency of wit-
nesses in some actions in admiralty, and the Rules of Practice in
Admiralty and Maritime Cases in effect since March 7, 1921, are to that
extent superseded. 4 4 This continuing distinction between types of ad-
rniralty cases will call for some difficult decisions on the part of a drafting
committee, but certainly there are no insurmountable obstacles.
Applicability of New Rules to Bankruptcy and Copyright Proceedings
The uniform federal rules of evidence should also apply to bankruptcy
and copyright proceedings. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not
applicable to bankruptcy or copyright proceedings except as made appli-
cable thereto by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. 45 After adop-
tion of the Federal Rules, General Order 37 was amended 146 so as to
provide that in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act the Rules of Civil
Procedure "shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act or
with [the General Orders] .. .be followed as nearly as may be."'1 47
The Rules of Practice for copyright infringement proceedings were also
amended to provide that such proceedings shall be governed by the Rules
of Civil Procedure insofar as they are not inconsistent with the Rules
of Practice. 48 Thus the rules of evidence in these two types of proceed-
ings are determined, generally speaking, by rule 43(a), 149 and it would
therefore follow that in this area, too, a body of uniform federal rules
can be substituted for 43 (a).
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rights of the Accused
The possible scope of federal evidentiary rules is limited by a number
of constitutional proscriptions designed to protect the accused. The rule
excluding from evidence the fruits of unlawful searches or seizures is
implied from the fourth and fifth amendments. 150 The protections fur-
nished by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment against
143 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 and 81(a) (1), as amended Feb. 28, 1966, 39 F.R.D. 213, 251 (1966)
(effective July 1, 1966).
144 Order of Supreme Court amending Fed. R. Civ. P., 39 F.R.D. 213, 251 (1966).
145 Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(1), as amended, 39 F.RD. 251 (1966).
146 General Orders in Bankruptcy, as amended 305 U.S. 698 (1939).
147 Ibid. See also General Order 36, id. at 698; Matter of Steinberg, 138 F. Supp. 462,
470 (S.D. Cal. 1956); In re C & P Co., 63 F. Supp. 400, 408 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
148 Copyright Rule 1, as amended 307 U.S. 652 (1939). Remick Music Corp. v. Inter-
state Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523 (D. Neb. 1944), aff'd, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 809 (1947).
149 See text accompanying note 132 supra.
150 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Collins v. United States, 289 F.2d
129 (5th Cir. 1961).
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the use of "coerced" confessions151 and against the use of evidence ob-
tained through brutality which offends a sense of justice,152 are made
available by the fifth amendment to the accused on trial in a federal
court. 55 There is no doubt that the fifth amendment would also be vio-
lated by the federal government's knowing use of false testimony in gain-
ing a conviction.154
In addition, there are four rules of evidence expressly set forth in the
Constitution. These are first, the provision that no person shall be con-
victed of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
overt act or on confession in open court, 55 second, the privilege against
self-incrimination, 5 6 third, the accused's right to confrontation,'157 and
fourth, the right of the accused to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses. 5 In regard to the second of these rules, the present view is
that the fifth amendment not only protects the accused from being com-
pelled to testify but also forbids adverse comment by federal prosecutors
and judges on the failure of the accused to take the stand.' 59 Uniform
Rule 23 (4) was drafted to allow such comment and the drawing of all
reasonable inferences arising from the failure to testify.1 0 Therefore it
would not be suitable for adoption by either the federal or state courts
because of its unconstitutionality.''
IM Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see McCormick, Evidence § 117 (1954),
George, Constitutional Limitations on Evidence in Criminal Cases 90 (1966).152 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770-71 (1966) (dictum) (blood test could deprive accused of due process).
153 Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1963) (dictum), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 936 (1964); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 753 (9th Cir. 1957) (dic-
tum), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958); United States v. Morales, 233 F. Supp. 160 (D.
Mont. 1964).
154 Kiger v. United States, 315 F.2d 778 (7th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 924
(1963).
155 U.S. Const. art. III, § 3.
156 U.S. Const. amend. V.
157 U.S. Const. amend. VI. For a state limitation on evidence rules in deference to the
right to confrontation see, e.g., NJ. Rule of Evidence 63(1) and Comment on Uniform Rule
63(4) (c) in Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence 148-53
(1963). Compare N.J. Rule 63(3) (a) (ii). The necessity of such a limitation is debatable
since Uniform Rule 63 (4) (c) attempts to make a statement admissible only under condition
of necessity and special trustworthiness. See notes 110 and 119 supra; Falknor, "Former
Testimony and the Uniform Rules: A Comment," 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 651, 655-60 (1963);
Note, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1965). The New Jersey Report, supra, gives other reasons
for limiting the rule to civil cases, citing, at 151, Quick, "Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity,
and the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4)," 6 Wayne L. Rev. 204, 219-24 (1960).
158 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
159 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965) (applying fourteenth amend-
ment to comment by prosecution with acquiescence of judge in state proceeding). Cf. U.S.
Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1964); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
160 Rule 23(4) provides: "If an accused in a criminal action does not testify, counsel
may comment upon accused's failure to testify, and the trier of fact may draw all rea-
sonable inferences therefrom."
161 Griffin v. California, supra note 159, held the California constitutional provision per-
mitting comment invalid under the fourteenth amendment. The New Jersey version of
23(4) differs from the language of the Uniform Rule, NJ. Stat. Ann. 2A:84A-17 (Supp.
1965), but the underlying principle is the same as that of the California provision.
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The recent case of Miranda v. Arizona 62 clarifies and extends the hold-
ing in Escobedo v. Illinois'63 which held inadmissible against a defendant
in a criminal case incriminating statements made by him under circum-
stances where he was not afforded his constitutional right to counsel.
Miranda decided that the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to counsel are applicable to interrogation by law enforcement offi-
cials while the accused is in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
in any significant way. The opinion in Miranda states:
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made vol-
untarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the
individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish
to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that
he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on
his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned. 164
The problem of the federal draftsman is to determine the extent to
which constitutional provisions should be taken into account in drafting
the rules. With regard to the preparation of the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence, the Committee which acted for the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws said in its Prefatory Note to the Rules:
((no special effort has been made to relate the rules of admissibility to all
possible limitations arising out of constitutional requirements of due
process, personal security and the like."' 65 The Note adds that a rule
would be inoperative where it would invade constitutional rights. 66 The
Kansas Evidence Code, 167 which largely follows the Uniform Rules, has
been characterized as incomplete because no consideration was given in
its preparation to important recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on self-incrimination, the admissibility of confessions, the function
162 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
163 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
164 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). Escobedo stresses the right to
counsel; Miranda refers expressly to the fifth amendment and self-incrimination.
165 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 163
(1953).166 Ibid.
167 Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-401-470 (1964).
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of the judge concerning the admissibility of confessions, and the scope and
effect of the right to counsel.' 68
At least three possible approaches to the draftsman's problem come to
mind: First, the Advisory Committee might follow the plan of the Uni-
form Rules. 16 9 This would make it necessary to consult both the Rules and
the decisions interpreting the Constitution when evidence questions arise.
The same thing might be necessary, however, under any approach.
Second, the federal rules of evidence might omit unconstitutional provi-
sions so far as feasible (e.g., leave out permission to comment on the
accused's failure to testify170 ) and set forth constitutional requirements at
the appropriate places (e.g., describe and prescribe the federal standard
as to the compulsion which will exclude a confession171). Third, the plan
of the California Evidence Code might be adopted. This is illustrated by
the following section of the Code:
To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the
United States or the State of California, a defendant in a criminal case
has a privilege not to be called as a witness and not to testify.172
The difficulties with the second alternative, so far as the listing of
constitutional requirements is concerned, are that some of the decisions
cannot easily be put into formal rules and that this field of the law seems
to be characterized at present by constant change. The third method
would avoid these difficulties.
The Erie Doctrine and Federal Evidence Rules
The doctrine stemming from Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 7 ' has been said to
have a constitutional basis .1 4 This doctrine, in the language of the Court,
is that "except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.' 75
The decision has been taken to apply to substance but not to procedure. 7 6
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 77 the doctrine was redefined by announc-
ing the "outcome-determination" test for distinguishing in a given case
168 Fowks & Harvey, "The New Kansas Code of Civil Procedure," 36 F.R.D. 51, 63
(1964). The decisions referred to were rendered after the approval of the Uniform Rules
but before passage of the Kansas statute.
169 See text accompanying note 165 supra.
170 But see notes 159-61 supra and accompanying text.
171 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).
172 Cal. Evid. Code § 930. Other examples are found in sections 940 and 1204.
173 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
174 Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 616-17 (1953); Hill,
"The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution," 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 427 (1958).
175 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
176 Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940);
Cook, Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflicts of Laws 189-92 (1949).
177 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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between substance and procedure. Taken literally, the test would leave
the federal courts with very little control over their procedure, since
almost any procedural rule could have a substantial effect on the outcome
of a case. However, the outcome test was modified by Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Co-op.,78 which stated that the outcome test does not govern
where there are countervailing considerations of sufficient importance. It
was held in Byrd that such considerations were present, since the strong
federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury rela-
tionship in the federal courts outweighed the policy against a different
result being reached by state and federal courts sitting in the same state. 79
Thus the Byrd case involved a weighing of state and federal interests.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Monarch Ins. Co. v.
Spach'80 relied upon Byrd in holding that a United States district court
sitting in Florida in a diversity case was not required to follow a Florida
statute making certain evidence inadmissible. The court gave two reasons
for its decision: first, that the federal court in exercising its judicial power
has a duty to hear and adjudicate and consequently has capacity to pre-
scribe rules which will enable the courts to fulfill these constitutional
demands;'I" second, that the historical purpose of the Federal Rules was
to substitute uniformity for the former partial conformity to state proce-
dure. 82 Both of these reasons are countervailing considerations in the
Byrd sense.
Until 1965 the test to be used to determine the validity of federal rules
of court remained uncertain. The outcome-determination test seemed well
established. Yet if applied literally, practically all of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would be invalid because the application of, or failure to
apply, them could affect the result of the litigation. In addition, there was
disagreement as to the nature of the modification established by Byrd.'83
Mr. Justice Harlan described the situation as follows: "It is unquestion-
ably true that up to now Erie and the cases following it have not succeeded
in articulating a workable doctrine governing choice of law in diversity
actions."' 84
178 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
179 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
180 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
181 Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1960). The case is susceptible
of a narrower interpretation, but it has been construed as establishing that Erie does not
require exclusion of evidence otherwise admissible. Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications,
Inc., 294 F.2d 681, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962). See Wright,
Federal Courts 358-59 (1963).
182 Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, supra note 181, at 407-08.
183 Compare Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, id. at 408; Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41,
48 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960); 1965 U. Ill. L.F. 934, 937-38, with
Degnan, "The Law of Federal Evidence Reform," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 275, 291 (1962).
184 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (concurring opinion).
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Observe that he said "up to now." He was concurring in the case of
Hanna v. Plumer,1a5 which did clarify the relation of Erie to the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court. In Hanna subject-matter jurisdic-
tion was based on diversity of citizenship, and service was made on the
defendant executor by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint
with defendant's wife at his residence. The district court sustained de-
fendant's attack on the adequacy of the service because of a lack of com-
pliance with a Massachusetts statute governing service on executors.
Plaintiff admitted noncompliance with the statute but relied on Federal
Civil Procedure Rule 4(d) (1) .11 Defendant conceded that the service
complied with the rule and thus raised the issue of whether service in a
diversity case is governed by the Federal Rule or by the state statute. The
ruling of the trial court against the sufficiency of the service was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 87 The Supreme Court
reversed, deciding that the federal court was not compelled to use the
method of service required by Massachusetts law. The majority held that
the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 8 ' does not constitute the appropriate
test of the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented
by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power
to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in
turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within
the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable
of classification as either.'89
This sudden development probably surprised some students of the
subject.190 One of them, prior to Hanna, had considered whether the
diversity clause in the constitutional provision. for federal judicial power
could be a source of law which would justify outcome differences, and
185 380 U.S. 460 (1965). As to the effect of the Hanna case see Moore Co. v. Sid
Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 347 F.2d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 925 (1966); Holtzoff, "A Landmark in Federal Procedural Reform," 10 Vill. L. Rev.
701 (1965).
186 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1) provides for service of summons and complaint as follows:
Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies
thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein ....
187 Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964).
188 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See text accompanying notes 175-76 supra.
189 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). The Court states that Erie has never
been used to void a Federal Rule, explaining that where state rules have been held to
apply in the face of an argument that a Federal Rule governed, the actual holding in each
case was that the Federal Rule did not apply. Id. at 470, citing, among other cases, Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). See Sylvestri v. Warner &
Swasey Co., 244 F. Supp. 524, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
290 See Degnan, supra note 183, at 289, 291-92; Keeffe et al., "Weary Erie," 34 Cornell
L.Q. 494, 525 (1949); Kurland, "Mr. justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie
Doctrine in Diversity Cases," 67 Yale L.J. 187, 187-88 (1957); McCoid, "Hanna v. Plumer:
the Erie Doctrine Changes Shape," 51 Va. L. Rev. 884 (1965).
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concluded that there was such doubt concerning the answer that an evi-
dence advisory committee should not venture "to probe the periphery of
Supreme Court doctrine."'' But that doubt has now been dispelled.
Congress has the power to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts
or to authorize the Court to prescribe them, even though they differ from
comparable state rules and may affect the "outcome" of litigation.
Although the Hanna case did not involve a rule of evidence, it certainly
throws light on the present subject. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
Court, distinguished the case where a given matter is not covered by a
federal rule of court from the case where it is so covered. In the former
situation the Erie doctrine applies, although the outcome-determination
test is not absolutely controlling; choices between state and federal law
are to be made not by any automatic criterion but by reference to the
policies underlying the Erie rule. These policies were described as "dis-
couragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administra-
tion of the laws."'92 But on the other hand, the Erie doctrine is not the
appropriate test of the validity of a given exercise of the Supreme Court's
rule-making power. The validity of rules of court issued under this power
is to be decided with reference to the scope of the Enabling Act 198 and the
distinction between substance and procedure drawn in Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co. 94 This case indicated that if the classification of a matter as sub-
stance or procedure is uncertain and the matter might rationally be
classified as either, the subject may be regulated by Congress. 95 It follows
that Congress may exercise the power to regulate by delegating to the
Supreme Court authority to make rules for the district courts.19 6
191 Degnan, supra note 183, at 292 n.76.
192 Hanna v. Plumer, supra note 189, at 468.
193 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964) provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district
courts of the United States in civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury ....
194 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
'95 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). This decision makes it clear that
Sibbach would have been decided the same way if it bad arisen after the case of Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In Hanna the Court stated that the validity of
the Federal Rules as issued by the Supreme Court is to be judged in the light of the sub-
stance-procedure distinction set forth in Sibbach. Hanna v. Plumer, supra at 470-71. The
Court quotes and uses the Sibbach test based on this distinction. Id. at 464. Moreover,
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), discussed at text accompanying
notes 178-83 supra, is cited by the majority in Hanna for the general proposition that the
outcome-determination analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman. Hanna v.
Plumer, supra, at 466-67. In other words, the outcome-determination test was not meant
to determine the rule of decision in every instance without reference to other considerations.
196 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1940). Even if the Court has inherent rule-
making authority, it is probably limited to prescribing procedural rules. See Washington-
Southern Nay. Co. v. Baltimore Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924); Shannon v. Cross, 245




Hanna v. Plumer recognizes the existence of constitutional restrictions
applicable to precepts promulgated under the rule-making authority.
These restrictions arise from the fact that the federal government is one
of delegated powers. A substance-procedure dichotomy is relevant to both
the restrictions and the Erie doctrine, but the line between substance and
procedure is not always the same in different legal contexts. We have
examined the tests which determine the application of Erie. For the pur-
poses of determining compliance with the Enabling Act and related con-
stitutional restrictions, the Hanna case declares that the question is to be
decided "in light of the distinction set forth in Sibback. ' '19T The distinc-
tion adopted by the Sibbach case is that "the test must be whether a rule
really regulates procedure-the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them."' 9
By issuing a rule which is within the authority of the Enabling Act
because it can rationally be classified as procedure, the Supreme Court
exercises a power delegated to Congress by "the constitutional provision
for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause) " 9 and passed on to the Court by Congress. If the matter covered
by the particular rule also rationally can be classified as substantive, and a
state does so, the federal classification prevails in the event of conflict
because of the supremacy clause. 00
It follows that since the Erie doctrine does not apply to the Federal
Rules, the distinction between substance and procedure which should
govern the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, and the
Judicial Conference in recommending, and the Supreme Court in adop-
ting,20' rules of evidence is the traditional one of the Sibbach case.
Effect of Limiting Language of the Enabling Acts
The Supreme Court of the United States and the highest court in many
of the states issue rules of court regulating procedure in the trial courts
197 Hanna v. Plumer, supra note 195, at 470-71.
398 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., supra note 196, at 14. The majority opinion in Hanna v.
Plumer, supra note 195, at 471-72, implies that a federal rule of decision which dearly is
not procedural in view of the Sibbach distinction would be unconstitutional, because such
a rule would not be supported by any grant of authority contained in the Constitution.
199 Id. at 472.200 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17. U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405
(1819).
201 The adoption procedure is set forth in the enabling statutes for the rules of admiralty,
28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1964), for bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964), for civil procedure, 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1964), and for criminal procedure prior to and including verdict, 18 U.S.C.§ 3771 (1964), under which the rules do not take effect until 90 days after they have been
reported to Congress by the Chief justice. They are required to be reported during a
regular session and not later than May 1. See Mars, "Federal Procedural Rule-Making: The
Program of the judicial Conference," 47 A.B.A.J. 772, 773 (1961). Bankruptcy is omitted
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of the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. °2 There is disagreement
as to the source of the power to promulgate such rules. It seems clear that
trial and appellate judges alike have inherent power to issue rules for
details of practice in the courts in which they preside.203 Whether there is
inherent power in the highest court to prescribe rules of practice and
procedure for lower courts, or whether the power must be conferred by
constitution or statute, is a disputed question.20 4 Yet by the better view this
inherent power does exist,20 5 although it is usually treated as being
subject to legislative regulation.00 The legislature may restrict the rule-
making power of the courts either by defining the extent of the power or
by itself enacting rules of practice and procedure and thereby partially or
wholly pre-empting the field. If the legislature does neither, the highest
court in the state or nation has the power customarily exercised by those
judicial tribunals which have exercised the power.
Apparently the Supreme Court has not decided whether it would have
the power, without a grant from Congress, to issue rules of court govern-
ing the district courts.20 7 The Court has been authorized by Congress to
promulgate rules of court for civil actions in the United States district
courts, for criminal cases and proceedings to punish for criminal contempt,
for bankruptcy proceedings, and for admiralty and maritime cases. 08
These statutes grant authority to issue rules of procedure which abrogate
earlier acts of Congress in conflict with the rules. Since several Supreme
from his list because the statute affecting those proceedings was not amended until after
the article was published.
202 See Joiner & Miller, "Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule-
Making," 55 Mich. L. Rev. 623, 624 (1957).
208 Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 367, 129 P.2d 308, 311 (1942); People v. Brown, 238
Mich. 298, 300, 212 N.W. 968 (1927); see Annots., 110 AL.R. 22 (1937), 158 A.L.R. 705
(1945).
204 Joiner & Miller, supra note 202, at 625-26.
205 Burney v. Lee, supra note 203; People v. Callopy, 358 IMI. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934);
State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1 (1936); Green, "To What Extent
May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?" 26 A.BAJ. 482
(1940).
206 Cooley, Constitutional Law 49 (4th ed. 1931); Levin & Amsterdam, "Legislative
Control Over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision," 107 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 3-4, 24 (1958); Morgan, "Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure," 2 Minn. L.
Rev. 81, 92 (1918). But see Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 245, 74 A.2d 406, 409 (1950).
The legislature nevertheless may not unreasonably limit or hamper the courts in the per-
formance of the duties imposed upon them by constitutions. Burney v. Lee, supra note 203,
at 364, 129 P.2d at 310.
207 See Memorandum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 323 U.S. 821 (1944). If the Court
has an inherent power, the acts of Congress undertaking to grant the power may still
have the effect of limiting the inherent power. See notes 205-06 supra and accompanying
text. There may be an implication in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), that the rule-
making power is in Congress and can be exercised by the Court only if delegated to it.
In any case, both Hanna v. Plumer, supra, and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)
seem to recognize the congressional power to regulate the Court's authority over procedure.
208 28 US.C. § 2072 (1964) (civil); 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964) (criminal); 28 US.C.
§ 2075 (1964) (bankruptcy); 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1964) (admiralty).
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Court cases have held evidence rules to be procedural, 0 9 and commenta-
tors have reached the same conclusion,10 the Court's authority under the
statute appears to extend to the formulation of rules of evidence. In addi-
tion, the authority of the Supreme Court to issue rules of evidence for the
district courts is supported not only by the Court's decisions but also by
its actual issuance of the Equity Rules which regulated evidence to some
extent211 and by its issuance of Federal Civil Rule 43,21 Federal Criminal
Rule 2 6,21. Bankruptcy General Order 37,214 and former Admiralty Rules
46A and 46B.21 5
There is general agreement that most of the rules of admissibility and
exclusion are procedural and, as applied to federal courts, are within fed-
eral power to control.216 Professor Degnan has found in contemporary
congressional usage an indication of a belief on the part of Congress "that
without express qualification the words practice and procedure include
evidence."21 7 Judge Clapp considers that, with two minor exceptions, all
the Uniform Rules of Evidence are procedural in nature and are within the
rule-making power.1 " Because there are at present few federal rules of
court dealing with the admissibility of specific types of evidence, the
periodicals and cases have usually discussed the propriety of applying
federal evidence law from the standpoint of the Erie doctrine. A substance-
procedure dichotomy is relevant to this doctrine as well as to the Acts of
Congress authorizing rules of court. However, the test for distinguishing
procedure from substance is not the same in each instance. The distinction
used to test compliance of a particular federal rule of court with the
enabling acts is whether the subject matter of the rule is primary rights
and duties or the methods of enforcing them. If the former, the rule
exceeds the authority given by the statute.21 9
Whether burden of proof is to be considered substantive or procedural
for the purpose of rule-making is uncertain. The term is usually considered
209 Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898); Dravo v. Fabel, 132 U.S. 487 (1889).
210 Clapp, 'Trivilege Against Self-Incrimination," 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 541, 565, 571 (1956);
Degnan, "The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts," 24 F.R.D. 341, 345
(1959); Sweeney, "Federal or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts," 27 Ill. L. Rev.
394, 398 (1932).
211 Equity Rules of 1912, 46-52, 226 U.S. 661-64 (1912).
212 Fed. R. Civ. P. 43. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
213 Fed. R. Crim. P. 26. See text accompanying notes 135-37 supra.
214 General Orders in Bankruptcy 37, 305 U.S. 698 (1939). See text accompanying notes
145-49 supra.
215 Admiralty R. 46A-46B, 307 U.S. 658-59 (1939).
216 See Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960); Wright, Federal Courts
§ 93, at 358-59 (1963); Degnan, supra note 183; joiner, "Uniform Rules of Evidence for
the Federal Courts," 20 F.R.D. 429, 435-39 (1957); Ladd, "Uniform Evidence Rules in
the Federal Courts," 49 Va. L. Rev. 692 (1963).
217 Degnan, supra note 183, at 281.
218 Clapp, supra note 210, at 571.
219 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
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to cover two different things, burden of persuasion and burden of going
forward with the evidence. The Supreme Court in two cases held burden
of proof to be substantive without saying which burden it considered sig-
nificant in connection with classification.220 These cases applied Erie, but
were decided before the outcome-determination test had become estab-
lished. Consequently they might be thought to govern rule-making even
if Erie is not applied. An earlier district court case, reviewing rules which
had the effect of allocating the burden of proof, considered them sub-
stantive. The court followed the state law as to the burden and based the
decision expressly on the substantive limitation of the Enabling Act and
the Erie case.221 On the other hand, the Restatement of Conflicts treats
burden of proof as procedural
222
Under Rule 14(a) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, a rebuttable
presumption has the effect of determining which party has the burden of
persuasion if the presumption is derived from basic facts having probative
value as evidence of the presumed fact. Thus there is a question as to
whether 14(a) should be included in the federal rules. Might it be held
to deal with substance and therefore to be outside the Supreme Court's
rule-making power? A difference of opinion as to the answer appears in
legal literature.2 2
3
Uniform Rule 14(b) provides that if the facts from which a presump-
tion arises have no probative value as evidence of the presumed fact, the
presumption no longer exists after the introduction of evidence which
would support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. The
Supreme Court has said that presumptions and their effects are substan-
tive. 24 However, the case in which this was said involved a presumption
establishing the burden of persuasion and may apply to subdivision (a) of
Uniform Rule 14 rather than subdivision (b). Other factors to be con-
sidered are that the case was using outcome determination as the test of
substance, and that the Restatement of Conflicts treats presumptions as
procedural2 2 5 Since the decision of the Hanna case, if the Supreme Court
issues as a rule of evidence a provision that all presumptions shall have the
minimum effect of shifting the burden of producing evidence, the rule
220 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308
U.S. 208 (1939). Cf. McCormick, Evidence § 332, 685-86 (1954).
221 Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1938).
222 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 595, comment (a) (1934). Accord, Restatement
(Second), Conflict of Laws § 598 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
223 The weight of opinion considers the question procedural. Restatement (Second), Con-
flict of Laws § 598 and accompanying comments (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965). For the
contrary view see Comment, 1964 Duke L.J. 867, 882-83.
224 Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 US. 437, 446 (1959).
225 See text accompanying note 222 supra.
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might be held to be a part of the judicial process for enforcing rights and
thus be valid under Sibbach and Hanna.228
The parol evidence rule is said to be a part of the substantive law of
contracts. Wigmore, however, pointed out that the so-called rule is really
made up of several rules.22 7 McCormick described one of them as proce-
dural-that one which determines who (as between judge and jury)
decides whether the writing was intended to supersede the alleged oral
agreement. 22 8 The federal courts seem to follow the traditional practice of
assigning this function to the judge.229 Since the intent of the parties is
certainly a question of fact, the decision by the judge can only be
justified by recognizing it as a preliminary procedural question; 230 other-
wise there would be a violation of the seventh amendment in many cases.
This procedural rubric could be incorporated validly in a federal rule of
court although the substantive aspect of the parol evidence rule, the doc-
trine of integration, probably could not.
There is considerable disagreement as to whether privileges are con-
trolled by state law.2 3 1 The controversy has been as to the application of
Erie, York, and Byrd. Hanna v. Plumer introduces a new factor. The
advisory committee must decide whether to avoid a controversial subject
or to include a provision on the subject and thereby present an additional
opportunity for debate and possible resolution of the matter.
CONCLUSION
The drafting of evidence rules for the federal courts is a challenging
task. In the past three decades the American Law Institute and the Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have devoted much
thought and effort to the development of the Model Code and Uniform
226 Ladd, supra note 216, at 698 n.20, seems to think that even Rule 14(a) would be
within the rule-making power where Erie does not apply. Degnan, supra note 183, at 283
n.35, distinguishes "merely regulating management of presumptions in the course of trial,
as Uniform Rules of Evidence 13-16 do," from creating presumptions. He asserts that the
latter affects substantive rights. Cf. id. at 299 n.102, on Erie and presumptions. "Conclusive
presumptions" are sometimes treated as part of the law of evidence but actually are sub-
stantive law. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2492 (3d ed. 1940).
227 Id. § 2400(3).
228 McCormick, Evidence § 214, at 434-36 (1954).
229 Id. § 215.
280 It is said to be a question for the court because it relates to admission of evidence.
Naumberg v. Young, 44 NJ.L. 331, 338 (1882). Federal cases referring to the parol evidence
rule as substantive probably refer to the integration rule, which is a part of contract and
property law. See Patterson-Ballagh Corp. v. Byron Jackson Co., 145 F.2d 786, 790 (9th
Cir. 1944).
231 E.g., Louisell, "Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Courts Today," 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101 (1956) (apply state privileges in all cases); Weinstein,
"Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction," 56 Colum. L.
Rev. 535, 545-47 (1956) (state privileges in diversity cases only); Pugh, "Rule 43(a) and
the Communication Privileged Under State Law: An Analysis of Confusion," 7 Vand. L. Rev.
556, 568 (1954) (federal courts not compelled to honor state privileges).
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Rules. The Uniform Rules have received more popular support than the
Code and have actually been adopted in a few jurisdictions. Nevertheless
they need additional thought and work and should be adapted to the
peculiar needs of the federal courts. They are superior to the common law,
even with its piecemeal statutory modifications. Yet it is probable that
even the Uniform Rules can be improved. The Federal Advisory Com-
mittee may do its own drafting, but it will probably draw to some extent
on the Uniform Rules and the recent codifications in five jurisdictions.
Prominent among these are California and New Jersey, where elaborate
studies were made. As a general plan for the project, several possibilities
present themselves. The draft may take the form of detailed rules, a state-
ment of principles, or a limited number of general rules. To borrow Pro-
fessor Maguire's phrase, the choice is "between a catalogue, a creed, and
a Code." It is unlikely that the committee will depend on a lengthy cata-
logue of desirable rulings such as Wigmore's Code of Evidence, published
in book form in 1910, or on a mere statement of principles. The third
possibility, which has been the plan of the Uniform Rules of the State
Commissioners and of the codes recently adopted, is the most probable
choice. Whatever form the draft takes, one objective must be improvement
of the law of evidence. Since even those who criticize some particular
effort agree that improvement is needed, a codification of existing law will
not be satisfactory. If those who have the responsibility of initiating the
rules can reconcile or choose wisely between the conflicting views which
have been expressed, operate successfully within the limits of federal
power and particularly of the Court's authority, and persuade the powers
that be to accept what they produce, their accomplishments may approach
those represented by the existing Federal Rules of Procedure.
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